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Abstract
Market participants argue that a significant unintended consequence of post-crisis
regulatory leverage ratio requirements is a reduction in the liquidity of fixed income
markets. We assess this claim in the context of the gilt (U.K. government bond) and
gilt repo markets over the period 2010 to 2017. We find that gilt repo liquidity worsened
during the period when U.K. leverage ratio policy was introduced, and that gilt liquidity
worsened conditional on factors such as funding costs and inventory risk. We also find
evidence that gilt repo liquidity has become less resilient. However, evidence from
heterogeneity in dealer behavior is inconclusive regarding a causal link between leverage
ratio requirements and the reduction in market liquidity.
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1 Introduction
Financial market commentary suggests that the liquidity of fixed income markets has deteri-
orated in recent years. Market participants argue that one of the key drivers of the apparent
reduction in liquidity has been post-crisis regulatory reform, particularly the regulatory lever-
age ratio introduced as part of Basel III. Unlike the risk-weighted capital framework, the
leverage ratio does not differentiate between the riskiness of assets. This means that activ-
ities with low credit and market risk, such as repo and trading in high-quality government
bonds, are subject to higher capital requirements under the leverage framework than under
the risk-weighted framework. To the extent it is binding, introducing a regulatory leverage
ratio requirement therefore increases the cost of market-making in these low-risk products.
Market participants argue that this increased cost has caused market-makers to reduce their
activity, pass on higher costs to their customers, or exit markets completely. These changes
in dealer behavior are reported to have resulted in reduced secondary market liquidity and
higher trading costs.
The academic literature on the impact of post-crisis regulation on market liquidity has
primarily focused on the Volcker Rule and fixed income markets in the United States (e.g.,
Bao et al., 2016; Trebbi and Xiao, 2017; Bessembinder et al., 2018; Dick-Nielsen and Rossi,
2018). To our knowledge, only Adrian et al. (2017a) have explicitly estimated the effect of
the regulatory leverage ratio on liquidity (they consider the corporate bond market in the
U.S.). This is despite the fact that the leverage ratio has frequently been cited as the element
of post-crisis regulatory reform with the strongest impact on fixed income businesses (CGFS,
2014; ICMA, 2015; CGFS, 2016).
We contribute to the literature on the costs and benefits of financial regulation by as-
sessing the impact of the leverage ratio on the liquidity of the gilt (U.K. government bond)
and gilt repo markets. There are two reasons that these markets have the potential to be
good testing grounds for the impact of the leverage ratio on liquidity. First, both markets
rely heavily on dealers for intermediation, and so their liquidity is likely to be sensitive to
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the regulatory costs faced by dealers when making markets. Second, authorities in the U.K.
implemented the leverage ratio earlier than the Basel and European Union timelines, mean-
ing that U.K.-regulated entities may have started to adjust to new regulatory requirements
earlier than their international peers.
We base our analysis on three rich proprietary datasets: the Zen dataset maintained by
the U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which contains transaction-level information
on secondary market trading in gilts; BrokerTec data on interdealer gilt repo transactions;
and regulatory data on gilt repo trading volumes collected by the Bank of England (Form
RSL). We use these datasets to estimate a range of measures of market liquidity, and use
principal components analysis to combine these into two liquidity indices: one for the gilt
market and one for the gilt repo market.
Major U.K. banks have only been formally subject to a minimum leverage ratio require-
ment since January 2016, and other U.K. banks became formally subject to a minimum
requirement in January 2018. But firms are likely to have started adjusting their balance
sheets much earlier than 2016 in response to a series of policy announcements, supervisory
expectations, and reporting requirements. The first major policy announcement was in De-
cember 2011, which we take to be the start of the adjustment period. We run three sets of
regressions to investigate changes in gilt and gilt repo liquidity from 2010 to 2017, and to
assess whether the leverage ratio had a causal role in these changes:
• Market-level time series regressions to assess whether average liquidity deteriorated
during the period when leverage ratio policy was introduced, conditional on a wide
range of control variables.
• Market-level quantile regressions to assess whether changes in the conditional distri-
bution of liquidity during this period indicate that liquidity became less resilient.
• Dealer-level panel regressions to investigate whether heterogeneity in the liquidity pro-
vision of individual dealers provides evidence for a causal link between the leverage
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ratio and any reduction in liquidity.
The market-level regression results suggest that gilt market liquidity did not worsen in an
unconditional sense after December 2011, but that gilt liquidity did worsen conditional on
factors such as funding costs and inventory risk. This suggests that, were funding conditions
to become less benign or interest rate volatility to increase, gilt liquidity could fall to lower
levels than previously would have been the case. In the case of gilt repos, our measures
of liquidity worsened from 2013 onwards, whether or not we control for other factors. For
both markets, the timing of the reduction in liquidity we find is consistent with results
from structural break tests (Andrews, 1993). Particularly sharp reductions in repo liquidity
on regulatory reporting dates — when we would expect dealer behavior to be especially
sensitive to regulatory constraints — potentially suggest a causal role for the leverage ratio
in the reduction in repo liquidity. We do not, however, observe these reporting-date effects
in the gilt market.
The market-level quantile regressions indicate that the (conditional) worsening in liquid-
ity in both the gilt and gilt repo markets was more pronounced in times of poor liquidity.
This is consistent with a reduction in the resilience of liquidity as leverage ratio policy was
introduced. Specifically, the conditional 0.9 quantile of illiquidity worsened more than the
conditional 0.5 quantile in both markets, although this difference is not always statistically
significant. We also find that sudden reductions in liquidity (“liquidity jumps”) have become
more frequent in the repo market, consistent with concerns that liquidity risk has increased.
While the market-level regression results indicate that liquidity worsened during the
period when leverage ratio policy was introduced, they do not provide strong evidence of a
causal link between the leverage ratio and liquidity because changes in liquidity over this
period might have been caused by some other omitted factor. In order to better identify
a potential causal impact, we run dealer-level panel regressions that exploit two sources of
heterogeneity across dealers: heterogeneity in the balance sheets of individual dealers and
heterogeneity in the timing of regulatory requirements across jurisdictions. These dealer-level
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regressions provide only weak evidence of a causal role for regulation. Simple difference-in-
differences regressions indicate that U.K. dealers with leverage ratios below 3% in December
2011 reduced their liquidity provision by more than dealers with leverage ratios above 3%.
This is consistent with a causal role for the leverage ratio in the reduction in liquidity.
However, this difference is not statistically significant, and other specifications provide no
evidence that the leverage ratio caused the reduction in liquidity.
We do not attempt to quantify the net benefits of the regulatory leverage ratio. Even if
the leverage ratio did cause a reduction in liquidity, two considerations suggest that this does
not necessarily imply a reduction in social welfare. First, there might be risks associated
with excessive liquidity. For example, excessive liquidity might be illusory, disappearing when
most needed (Cunliffe, 2015); and excessive repo liquidity might encourage over-reliance on
short-term funding (CGFS, 2017). Second, by leading to an increase in the capitalization of
banks, the leverage ratio is likely to have increased their resilience to shocks. An assessment
of the overall impact of the leverage ratio on financial stability and social welfare is beyond
the scope of this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we summarise the debate on
the effects of regulation on market liquidity and the related academic literature. In Section 3,
we describe the gilt and gilt repo markets from an institutional perspective, and summarise
the history of the Basel and U.K. leverage ratio frameworks. In Section 4, we describe our
datasets and use them to illustrate some recent trends in the gilt and gilt repo markets. In
Section 5, we explain how we estimate liquidity measures for the two markets, and describe
recent trends in these measures. In Section 6, we set out our empirical strategy for assessing
the effects of the leverage ratio on market liquidity, and summarise the results of the market-
level regressions. In Section 7, we consider the question of whether liquidity has become less
resilient, through quantile regressions and estimates of the frequency of “jumps” in liquidity.
In Section 8, we use heterogeneity in dealer behavior to assess whether the leverage ratio
had a causal impact on liquidity. We conclude in Section 9.
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2 Related literature
This paper contributes to the debate on the effects of post-crisis regulatory reform on market
liquidity. Market participants argue that new regulations — particularly the leverage ratio
and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) proposed as part of Basel III, and the Volcker Rule
introduced as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in
the U.S. — have led to a deterioration in liquidity across a range of markets (e.g., ICMA,
2015; Morgan Stanley and Oliver Wyman, 2015, 2016). In these reports, the authors argue
that new prudential standards have increased costs for market-makers across a range of
markets, leading to a reduction in the balance sheet capacity allocated to market-making and
therefore to a reduction in the liquidity of dealer-intermediated markets. Market participants
argue that the effect is not uniform across jurisdictions, which can be partly explained by
differences in implementation timelines, calibration, and frequency of reporting requirements
(CGFS, 2017).
Academic studies paint a more mixed picture when assessing recent trends in the liquidity
of fixed income markets. Most studies have focussed on U.S. markets. Studying post-crisis
liquidity in U.S. fixed income markets, Adrian et al. (2017b), Anderson and Stulz (2017), and
Bessembinder et al. (2018) find mixed evidence across liquidity measures. Trebbi and Xiao
(2017) test for structural breaks in the liquidity of U.S. corporate and government bonds and
find no evidence that liquidity has deteriorated in recent years. Instead, the breaks appear to
indicate a move towards improved liquidity. On the other hand, by focussing on dates when
bonds are excluded from an investment grade index, Dick-Nielsen and Rossi (2018) find that
the cost of immediacy in the U.S. corporate bond market has increased since the 2007-2009
financial crisis. Similarly, Bao et al. (2016) find that U.S. corporate bonds have suffered a
larger deterioration in liquidity upon being downgraded since the introduction of the Volcker
Rule. They also find that dealers subject to the Volcker Rule have reduced their provision
of liquidity in this market relative to non-Volcker dealers. Choi and Huh (2017) argue that
since the crisis, liquidity in the U.S. corporate bond market has increasingly been provided
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by non-dealers rather than dealers, and that this might help to explain the varying results
across studies. The evidence also appears to be mixed in non-U.S. markets. Aquilina and
Suntheim (2017) analyse the U.K. corporate bond market and conclude that it became more
liquid after the financial crisis. The IMF (2015) investigates the liquidity of fixed income
markets in the U.S., Europe, emerging markets, and Japan, and finds that trends in liquidity
differ according to the market considered and the measure used.
Few researchers have attempted to empirically link changes in market liquidity to the in-
troduction of the regulatory leverage ratio. This is despite the fact that the leverage ratio has
frequently been cited as the element of post-crisis regulatory reform with the strongest im-
pact on fixed income businesses (CGFS, 2014; ICMA, 2015; CGFS, 2016). To our knowledge,
only one paper reports the impact of leverage ratio policy on market liquidity. Analysing
the U.S. corporate bond market, Adrian et al. (2017a) find that prior to the financial crisis,
bonds traded by more levered institutions were more liquid, but that this relation reversed
after new regulations were introduced, such that bonds traded by institutions with lower
leverage were more liquid. Adrian et al. (2017a) argue that this is consistent with leverage
regulation causing a reduction in liquidity. Other researchers have assessed the impact of
the leverage ratio on the behavior of individual banks. Acosta-Smith et al. (2018) find that
leverage-constrained European banks shifted towards higher risk-weighted activity following
the Basel III leverage ratio announcement. Allahrakha et al. (2018) find that the introduction
of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) in the U.S. in 2012 led affected broker-dealers to
decrease their total repo borrowing but to increase their use of repo backed by more price-
volatile collateral. Conversely, Bucalossi and Scalia (2016) find that leverage-constrained
European banks did not reduce their repo volumes between 2013 and 2014. However, in
none of these is the potential impact of this behavior on market liquidity assessed. On the
theoretical side, Cimon and Garriott (2017) show that the leverage ratio and other post-crisis
regulations lead market makers to intermediate fewer client trades.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the determinants of market liquidity more
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broadly, including the impact of balance sheet constraints and funding costs on liquidity.
From a theoretical perspective, Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) show that limited market-maker capital can impact liquidity. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) show that funding liquidity is also an important determinant of market
liquidity. The study closest to our research is Benos and Zikes (2018), who also consider
the determinants of liquidity in the gilt market. In line with theoretical results, they show
that dealer balance sheet constraints (proxied by aggregate net trading volume) and funding
costs are important determinants of liquidity. However, their paper focusses on the crisis
period, before new regulatory requirements were introduced.
Our paper is also related to a small recent empirical literature on the resilience of liq-
uidity, spurred by market commentary claiming that the risk of “flash crashes” and sudden
reductions in liquidity has risen. The IMF (2015) examines the effects of structural drivers
and cyclical factors on the level and resilience of market liquidity. The authors conclude
that changes in market structure, such as larger and more concentrated holdings of cor-
porate bonds by mutual funds, may have increased the fragility of liquidity. They argue
that accommodative monetary policy and benign cyclical conditions in recent years may be
masking growing liquidity risks. Adrian et al. (2015a,b) use the frequency of sudden large
increases in a composite illiquidity metric as a measure of liquidity risk. They find that
jumps in illiquidity have become more frequent in the U.S. equity and Treasury markets
in recent years. In contrast, there appears to be no increase in the liquidity risk of U.S.
corporate bonds, a heavily dealer-intermediated market that might have been expected to
be more sensitive to changes in regulation. Following a similar approach, CGFS (2016) finds
an increase in the frequency of jumps in the bid-ask spreads of U.S., Japanese, and Italian
government bonds in recent years.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first report of a study of liquidity in the gilt repo
market. Most empirical papers on repo markets have focussed on U.S. markets (Gorton and
Metrick, 2012; Copeland et al., 2014; Krishnamurthy et al., 2014) and euro markets (Mancini
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et al., 2016).
3 Institutional and regulatory background
In this section, we describe the gilt and gilt repo markets from an institutional perspective.
We then discuss the regulatory leverage ratio.
3.1 The gilt market
Gilts are U.K. government bonds, issued by the U.K. Debt Management Office (DMO). The
DMO issues gilts, typically via auctions and syndications, to financial institutions designated
as primary dealers for the gilt market, known as Gilt-Edged Market Makers (GEMMs). There
are currently 18 GEMMs, although there has been entry and exit among the GEMMs, such
that 25 firms have been GEMMs at some point since 2008.1
The vast majority of secondary-market trading in gilts takes place over the counter. End-
investors typically transact with GEMMs, either negotiating trades bilaterally over the phone
or through electronic trading platforms. The GEMMs are required to provide secondary
market liquidity by quoting continuous bid and ask prices to their customers. In return,
the GEMMs are entitled to certain privileges. For example, they are the only institutions
eligible to bid directly in the DMO’s gilt auctions, so that other market participants wishing
to bid must route their order through a GEMM.2 GEMMs frequently trade with each other,
in order to rebalance their gilt portfolios and to hedge trades with their clients. Often this
takes place through interdealer brokers (IDBs), which act as intermediaries for anonymous
trading between the market-makers.
The main investors in gilts are U.K.-based insurance companies and pension funds, and
1The current GEMMs are Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC,
Jefferies, JP Morgan, Lloyds, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Nomura, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of
Scotland, Santander, Toronto-Dominion Bank, UBS, and Winterflood Securities. The other firms that have
been GEMMs since 2008 are ABN Amro, Lehman Brothers, Commerzbank, Scotiabank, Société Générale,
State Street, and Credit Suisse.
2See DMO (2017) for more detail on the role of GEMMs.
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overseas investors such as governments, central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and asset man-
agers. Currently, the largest single holder of gilts is the Bank of England, which since 2009
has purchased gilts through its Asset Purchase Facility (APF) in its program of quantitative
easing.
3.2 The gilt repo market
A market closely related to the gilt market is the gilt repo market. Formally, a repo is a
repurchase agreement: one counterparty sells a security to another counterparty for a given
price, and commits to repurchase the same (or similar) security at a specified future date and
for a specified price. The trade is economically equivalent to a secured loan: the underlying
security acts as collateral, and the difference between the prices at which the security is
sold and repurchased implies an annualised interest rate known as the repo rate. From the
perspective of the cash borrower, the transaction is referred to as a repo, while from the
perspective of the cash lender, it is referred to as a reverse repo. If the precise security to be
exchanged is agreed when the trade is struck, the trade is referred to as a specific collateral
repo. Alternatively, the counterparties may agree that any of a certain group of securities
may be exchanged. In this case, the trade is referred to as a general collateral repo.
The vast majority of sterling-denominated repo involves the sale and repurchase of gilts.
A wide range of market participants use the gilt repo market. Money market funds, corpo-
rates, and local authorities use the market to deposit cash securely. Meanwhile, hedge funds,
asset managers, pension funds, and insurance companies borrow cash via repos to finance
leveraged investment strategies. GEMMs frequently use the gilt repo market to cover short
gilt positions. Banks use reverse repos to borrow gilts for their liquid asset buffers. And if
a bank needed to liquidate gilts at short notice, it would most likely access the repo mar-
ket, rather than sell the gilts outright in the secondary market. The gilt repo market also
plays an important role in the Bank of England’s monetary policy transmission and liquidity
insurance operations (see Bank of England, 2015a).
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Like the secondary gilt market, the gilt repo market is intermediated by a group of
dealer banks, and there is significant overlap between the communities of GEMMs and repo
dealers. The interdealer repo market is also intermediated by interdealer brokers, mostly
using electronic broking platforms, the largest of which is BrokerTec. Almost all interdealer
gilt repo trading is at overnight term, and the vast majority of interdealer gilt repo trades
are centrally cleared through LCH Limited. In contrast to the dollar repo market, only a
small proportion of the gilt repo market is intermediated by tri-party agents.
3.3 The leverage ratio
Following the global financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
undertook a significant program of reform to banking regulation known as Basel III. This
proposed new international regulatory standards for capitalization and liquidity risk man-
agement. The revised capital standards include reforms to the risk-based capital framework
that existed under previous Basel accords, and a new regulatory leverage ratio to supplement
the risk-based framework.
The leverage ratio is an indicator of a firm’s solvency, and is defined as Tier 1 capital
divided by the exposure measure. The exposure measure includes on-balance sheet expo-
sures, derivative exposures, securities financing transaction exposures (including repo), and
certain off-balance sheet exposures. Requiring banks to maintain a minimum leverage ratio
is intended to “restrict the build-up of leverage in the banking sector to avoid destabilizing
deleveraging processes that can damage the broader financial system and the economy” and
to “reinforce the risk-based requirements with a simple, non-risk based ‘backstop’ measure”
(BCBS, 2014).
The BCBS first indicated that it planned to introduce a regulatory leverage ratio in a
consultation document in 2009 (BCBS, 2009). In 2010, the BCBS proposed a 3% minimum
leverage ratio (BCBS, 2010). At this time, the BCBS also proposed a transition path to
implementation, whereby banks would be required to publically disclose their leverage ratios
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from January 2015 and meet a 3% minimum as part of their Pillar 1 capital requirements
by January 2018. In 2014, the BCBS finalized the definition of the leverage ratio that banks
would be required to disclose from 2015 and reiterated that the leverage ratio would become
a Pillar 1 requirement from 2018 (BCBS, 2014).
The way in which domestic legislators and regulators have implemented the leverage ratio
varies across jurisdictions: see Bank of England (2014a) for a summary. Since most GEMMs
and gilt repo dealers are U.K. banks or U.K. subsidiaries of foreign banks, the leverage ratio
frameworks most relevant to the functioning of the gilt and gilt repo markets have been those
of the U.K. and EU.
U.K. authorities implemented the leverage ratio earlier than the Basel and EU timelines.
In December 2011, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee (FPC) recommended
that the FSA (the U.K. regulator at the time) encourage banks “to disclose their leverage
ratios... not later than the beginning of 2013” (Bank of England, 2011), two years ahead
of the Basel timeline for disclosure. The FSA implemented this recommendation by asking
large U.K. banks to publish their leverage ratios in their 2012 annual reports and on a bi-
annual basis thereafter. In June 2013, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), which
now regulates U.K. banks, required two large U.K. banks that did not meet a 3% leverage
ratio to submit plans for how they would reach that standard (Bank of England, 2013b).
Major U.K. banks have been expected to meet a 3% leverage ratio since January 2014, four
years ahead of the Basel and EU implementation date of January 2018 (Bank of England,
2013a). Following a review by the FPC (Bank of England, 2014a,b), the PRA finalized
the U.K. leverage ratio framework in 2015 (Bank of England, 2015c,b), stipulating a 3%
minimum requirement for large U.K. banks starting in January 2016. Other U.K. banks
became subject to a 3% minimum requirement from January 2018 under CRD IV. See Table
1 for a summary of this timeline.
Several large dealers in the gilt and gilt repo markets are U.K. subsidiaries of U.S. banks.
This means that the U.S. leverage ratio framework might also have an impact on the func-
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tioning of these markets. A domestic leverage ratio has applied to U.S. banks since 1981,
but the framework has been substantially revised and toughened in recent years (includ-
ing changes to the definition of the exposure measure). The supplementary leverage ratio
(SLR), proposed in June 2012 and finalized in July 2013, implements the Basel III leverage
ratio in the U.S. In addition, the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) requires
G-SIBs and insured depository institutions of G-SIBs to meet 5% and 6% minimum leverage
ratios, respectively. See Allahrakha et al. (2018) for more detail on the U.S. leverage ratio
framework.
The leverage ratio exposure measure does not seek to differentiate between the riskiness
of different assets. Taken in isolation, activities that receive low risk-weights under the risk-
based framework (such as market-making in the gilt and gilt repo markets) are therefore
more capital intensive under the leverage framework than under the risk-based framework.
If binding, the introduction of a regulatory leverage ratio therefore increases the capital
requirements associated with these business lines. On the basis that equity is more expensive
than debt for banks,3 participants in these and related markets have argued that a higher
marginal cost of market-making is causing market-makers to reduce their activity, charge
higher margins, or exit certain markets completely (CGFS, 2014; SLRC, 2014; ICMA, 2015;
DMO, 2016). Indeed, two recent GEMM resignations — by Credit Suisse in 2015 and Société
Générale in 2016 — have been attributed to the increased capital cost of market-making in
gilts (Reuters, 2016). In aggregate, these changes in dealer behavior are reported to have
resulted in reduced secondary market liquidity in both the gilt and gilt repo markets.
4 Data and summary statistics
We use three proprietary datasets: the “Zen” dataset maintained by the U.K. Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA), which contains transaction-level information on secondary market
trading in gilts; transaction-level data from the BrokerTec platform for interdealer gilt repos;
3This claim is questioned by, for example, Miles et al. (2013).
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and regulatory data on gilt repo activity collected by the Bank of England (Form RSL). In
this section, we discuss the three key proprietary datasets before setting out some descriptive
summary statistics for the gilt and gilt repo markets.
4.1 Zen dataset
Our analysis of the secondary market for gilts is based on the Zen dataset maintained by
the FCA.4 This dataset has also been used by Aquilina and Suntheim (2017) and Benos and
Zikes (2018).
The Zen dataset includes transaction reports for all secondary market trades in gilts where
at least one counterparty is an EEA firm. Since GEMMs are EEA entities, the dataset covers
the entire gilt market-making business of dealers. Each transaction report includes the date,
time, quantity, price, International Securities Identification Number (ISIN), a buyer/seller
flag, trading capacity information, the identity of the reporting firm, and in most cases, the
identity of their counterparty. The counterparty identifier field allows us to match reports in
cases where both counterparties report the trade. We clean the data by dropping trades that
are implausibly large or small, or that have prices far from the end-of-day prices recorded
by Bloomberg. The dataset covers the period from January 2008 to December 2017, with
a total of 2,527 business days. After cleaning and matching trade reports, our final dataset
has around 9.4 million unique trades.
4.2 BrokerTec
We obtain transaction-level data on the interdealer gilt repo market from BrokerTec (owned
by NEX Group), which is the largest electronic platform for interdealer gilt repos. For each
transaction, we observe the date, time, quantity, repo rate, and collateral. The collateral
information allows us to classify trades as general collateral or specific collateral. The dataset
is anonymized.
4Trades prior to August 2011 are recorded in a similar database called Sabre II.
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We estimate that the BrokerTec data cover the majority of the interdealer gilt repo
market. And comparisons with the Form RSL data (discussed below) suggest that the
BrokerTec data cover around 40% of the total gilt repo market (by value). We use data for
the January 2006 to December 2017 period, consisting of 3,032 business days. The dataset
consists of around 2.3 million trades.
4.3 Form RSL
Between February 1996 and May 2018, participants in the gilt repo market reported quarterly
summary statistics of their activity to the Bank of England through Form RSL. Reporting
was voluntary, but as of 2017 around 35 institutions chose to report, including most of the
major dealer banks. Firms reported their turnover and number of transactions (summing
over the quarter and aggregating across counterparties), as well as the cash value of their
outstanding positions. In this paper, we focus on total repo turnover (value of cash borrowed,
summed across all maturities), because repo borrowing increases the leverage exposure mea-
sure.
4.4 Summary statistics
Figure 1 shows the nominal value of gilts outstanding. The stock of gilts in issue has grown
substantially since the financial crisis, from around £400 billion in 2008 to nearly £1.5 trillion
by the end of 2017. Since 2009, the Bank of England has purchased a stock of £435 billion
of gilts through its Asset Purchases Facility (APF) by market value. Since the pace of gilt
issuance by the DMO was generally faster than the pace of asset purchases by the Bank
of England, the nominal “free float” — total outstanding gilts minus government holdings,
APF holdings, and other Bank of England holdings — more than doubled between 2008 and
2017.
Gilt trading volumes did not keep pace with the growth of gilts in issue over this period.
Figure 2 shows annual gilt trading volumes and turnover ratios, which measure trading
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volume relative to gilts outstanding and free float. Trading volumes increased between 2008
and 2017. But given the large increases in the stock of gilts outstanding and free float,
turnover ratios fell over this period. The ratio of trading volume to free float fell from 8.4 in
2013 to 5.8 in 2016, before increasing to 6.6 in 2017. Figure 3 shows the number of trades
per year and the average trade size. Both increased after the financial crisis. The average
trade size has remained stable since 2013, while the number of trades increased in 2017.
Figure 4 shows aggregate annual repo borrowing in the gilt repo market since 1997,
broken down by maturity. The market tripled in size between 1997 and the financial crisis.
It continued to grow after the financial crisis, which Jackson and Sim (2013) argue reflected a
substitution from unsecured borrowing to secured borrowing, driven by heightened sensitivity
to credit risk and new liquidity regulations. Repo volumes then fell sharply between 2012
and 2016, a trend that market participants primarily attributed to the regulatory leverage
ratio (SLRC, 2014; ICMA, 2015). The average size of a gilt repo trade also fell substantially
over this period (Figure 5), from £74 million in 2009 to £42 million in 2016, potentially
indicating reduced liquidity. However, gilt repo activity increased markedly in 2017. Market
participants argued that this partly reflected more efficient balance sheet allocation from a
regulatory perspective (Money Markets Committee, 2017).
Figures 4 and 5, which are based on the Form RSL data, refer to the gilt repo market
as a whole. But similar trends are also evident in the interdealer market, as recorded by
BrokerTec. Figure 6 shows a significant fall in interdealer gilt repo volumes between 2012
and 2015, followed by a substantial increase in 2017. Since the financial crisis, there has
been a very large reduction in repo trades of longer maturity. By 2012, more than 99% of
interdealer gilt repo trading by value was at overnight maturity. The average trade size in
the interdealer gilt repo market also fell sharply during the post-crisis period, from around
£50 million in 2009 to less than half of this amount in 2015, before partially recovering in
2017 (Figure 7).
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5 Measures of market liquidity
There are three concepts of liquidity in the literature: monetary liquidity, which relates
to the ease of converting monetary assets into goods and services; funding liquidity, which
relates to the ability of market participants to obtain funding; and market liquidity, which
relates to the ease with which an asset can be traded (ECB, 2012; IMF, 2015). This paper is
principally concerned with market liquidity. But market liquidity itself has multiple facets,
and no one metric is likely to measure it perfectly. We therefore construct several measures
of market liquidity that have frequently been used in the literature.
5.1 Gilt liquidity measures
For the gilt market, we compute four measures of market liquidity. The first three are con-
structed using transaction-level information from the Zen dataset, at the level of individual
bonds. We then take the median across bonds to form a market-level measure. The fourth
(yield curve noise) is estimated using end-of-day yields from Bloomberg, and is calculated
at the level of the market rather than individual bonds. All the measures are computed at
daily frequency, with higher values indicating lower liquidity.
1. Amihud measure: Amihud (2002) measures liquidity as the ratio of absolute return
to trading volume. This measure is intended to indicate the price impact of trades.
Following Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), we estimate price impact at the level of individual
trades, and then average over the trade-level values each day to obtain a measure at
daily frequency. More precisely, for a given gilt and a given day t, we define ri,t to be
the return and Qi,t to be the trade size (in £ million) of the ith trade, and define Nt
to be the number of trades. The Amihud measure at the gilt level is the daily average
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2. Roll measure: Roll (1984) shows that under certain assumptions, the percentage bid-
ask spread is equal to two times the square root of the negative first-order serial covari-
ance of returns. The intuition is that the transaction price will tend to bounce between
the bid price and ask price so that returns on consecutive trades are negatively corre-
lated, and that this negative correlation will be larger if the bid-ask spread is wider.
For a given gilt and a given day t, we define ri,t to be the return on the ith trade. We
define the Roll measure at the gilt level as:
Rollt = 2
√
max {0,−cov (ri,t, ri−1,t)}.
3. Round-trip cost (RTC): As an additional measure of the bid-ask spread, we estimate
the round-trip cost of trading a bond, following Goldstein et al. (2007). We search for
instances in which a given dealer buys a gilt from a client, and then the same dealer
sells the same gilt to another client on the same day (or alternatively, instances in
which a given dealer sells a gilt to a client, and then buys the same gilt from another
client on the same day); and we find the dealer’s return on this pair of transactions.
For a given gilt and a given day, we then take the average of these returns.
4. Yield curve noise: Following Hu et al. (2013), our final measure of liquidity for the gilt
market is based on the differences between observed bond yields and the fitted yields
from a smoothed yield curve. The intuition is that these differences indicate deviations
from fundamental values. The noise measure is computed as the root-mean-squared
difference between end-of-day actual and fitted yields on bonds with maturity between
5In line with Bessembinder et al. (2009), we exclude trades smaller than £100,000 because these can have
a disproportionate effect on the Amihud measure.
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one and ten years. For fitted yields, we use the Bank of England’s fitted nominal gilt
curve, which is based on the Anderson and Sleath (2001) variable roughness penalty
(VRP) approach. On day t, suppose that there are Nt conventional gilts with residual
maturity between one and ten years. We define yit to be the actual end-of-day yield
of gilt i, and yi (bt) to be the fitted yield of gilt i based on the model parameters bt






[yit − yi (bt)]
2
.
Our estimated liquidity measures for the gilt market are shown in Figure 8, with higher values
indicating worse liquidity. We combine the information from these measures by extracting
the first principal component, which is shown in Figure 11.6 Annual averages of the four
measures are shown in Table 2, along with the factor loadings of the first principal component.
The four measures are strongly correlated, with the first principal component explaining 71%
of the sample variance. All four measures increased sharply during the financial crisis of 2007-
2009, before drifting back down over late 2009 and 2010. Most of the measures were again
elevated over 2011-2012, during the European sovereign debt crisis. The measures exhibited
substantial volatility between 2014 and 2017.
5.2 Repo liquidity measures
We construct three liquidity measures for the interdealer gilt repo market, in each case using
the transaction-level BrokerTec data. We construct these separately for general collateral
trades and specific collateral trades, at daily frequency. All measures are constructed using
overnight trades only (over 99% of the trades in the sample are overnight). The specific
collateral measures are constructed at the level of the underlying security, and we take the
6Before computing the first principal component, we standardize the measures to have mean zero and
standard deviation equal to one.
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median across securities to form a market-level measure.
1. Amihud: As for gilts, we construct an Amihud measure of repo liquidity, which is
intended to measure the impact on the repo rate of a £1 million trade. For a given
underlying security and a given day t, we define Ri,t to be the repo rate and Qi,t, to
be the trade size (in £ million) of the ith trade, and define Nt to be the number of
trades. The Amihud measure for repo is then the daily average of absolute changes in













max {0,−cov (Ri,t −Ri−1,t, Ri−1,t −Ri−2,t)}.
3. Effective spread: As an alternative measure of the bid-ask spread, and following Hong
and Warga (2000), we calculate the effective bid-ask spread. This is defined as the
difference between the volume-weighted average repo rates on cash-borrower-initiated
and cash-lender-initiated trades.
Our estimated liquidity measures for the gilt repo market are shown in Figures 9 and 10 and
in Table 3, again with higher values indicating worse liquidity. The first principal component
is shown in Figure 11. As for gilts, the repo liquidity measures are strongly correlated. The
first principal component explains 60% of the variance of the three measures for general
collateral, 70% of the variance of the three measures for specific collateral, and 53% of the
variance when we pool the six measures. The measures indicate that repo liquidity worsened
during the early stages of the financial crisis in 2007, before deteriorating dramatically with
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. This is in line with the findings of
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Gorton and Metrick (2012) for the U.S. repo market.
All of the measures indicate a worsening in gilt repo liquidity over the post-crisis period.
We can use Table 3 to compare recent levels of liquidity to pre-crisis levels. All six measures
indicate that liquidity was worse on average in 2017 than in 2006, although in most cases the
difference is modest. However, it is important to emphasise that these measures only use data
from the interdealer market, which is almost entirely overnight and centrally cleared. These
characteristics mean that the interdealer market is likely to be the part where most netting
can occur under leverage ratio rules, making this segment the least affected by leverage
ratio requirements. As such, to the extent that this reduction in liquidity was caused by
the leverage ratio, it is likely to represent a lower bound for any deterioration in gilt repo
liquidity more broadly.
6 Market-level analysis
We seek to test the hypothesis that the introduction of leverage ratio policy in the U.K.
caused a reduction in the liquidity of the gilt and gilt repo markets. Our empirical analysis
proceeds in three steps:
• First, we estimate market-level time series regressions, to assess how the liquidity of the
gilt and gilt repo markets changed during the period when U.K. leverage ratio policy
was introduced, conditional on other factors. By identifying changes in liquidity on
key reporting dates, when dealers’ behavior is likely to be most sensitive to regulatory
requirements, these regressions also provide preliminary evidence on whether there was
a causal link between the leverage ratio and liquidity.
• Second, we estimate market-level time series quantile regressions. While the first set of
regressions provides information about the conditional mean of liquidity, the quantile
regressions indicate how other parts of the conditional distribution changed during this
period, providing insights into the resilience of liquidity.
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• Third, we estimate dealer-level panel regressions, which use heterogeneity in dealer
behavior to identify any causal relationship between the leverage ratio and changes in
liquidity.
In this section, we discuss the market-level time series regressions. The quantile regressions
and panel regressions are discussed in Sections 7 and 8, respectively.
6.1 Market-level regression specifications
The primary role of our market-level regressions is to investigate how the liquidity of the
gilt and gilt repo markets changed during the period when U.K. leverage ratio policy was
introduced. Major U.K. banks have only been formally subject to a minimum leverage
ratio requirement from January 2016, and other U.K. banks became formally subject to
a minimum requirement in January 2018. But firms are likely to have started to adjust
their balance sheets much earlier than this in response to a series of policy announcements,
supervisory expectations, and reporting requirements (see Subsection 3.3 and Table 1 for
more detail). The first of these announcements was in December 2011, so we assume that
the adjustment process began in 2012 or later. We therefore include indicator variables for the
years 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 in order to estimate whether the conditional
mean of liquidity shifted during this period. We also employ structural break tests as a
complement to this regression analysis.
While the indicator variables provide information on whether there was a change in liq-
uidity during the period when banks were adjusting to meet leverage ratio requirements,
they cannot establish causality, because any change in liquidity might have been caused by
variables omitted from the regressions. To provide preliminary evidence on causality, we ad-
ditionally include indicator variables for quarter-ends from 2012 and month-ends from 2014.
Large U.K. banks started to disclose quarter-end leverage ratios in 2012 (following the FPC’s
December 2011 recommendation), and all PRA-regulated firms started to report leverage
ratios based on month-end balance sheets in 2014 (when EU-level reporting requirements,
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COREP, came into force). Dealers’ behavior is likely to have been particularly sensitive to
leverage ratio policy on these dates. If the leverage ratio did cause a change in liquidity,
we therefore expect this to be particularly pronounced at month-ends and quarter-ends. We
consider the question of causality more formally in Section 8.
By providing information on the determinants of liquidity more broadly, these regres-
sions also allow us to test several other hypotheses concerning, for example: the impact of
market structure on liquidity; the impact of predictable events, such as Bank of England QE
purchases and DMO gilt auctions, on liquidity; and the relation between funding liquidity
and market liquidity.
We run separate regressions for gilts and gilt repos. The regressions are at daily frequency,
for the period January 2010 to December 2017 (to exclude the impact of the financial crisis),
and take the following form:
Liquidityt = β0 + β1Y earIndicatorst + β2PeriodEndIndicatorst (1)
+β3LiquidityOtherMarkett−1
+β4FundingCostst−1 + β5Sentimentt−1 + β6InventoryRiskt−1
+β7EuroCrisist−1 + β8MarketStructuret−1 + β9GiltMarketEventst
+β10OtherControlst + εt,
where:
• Liquidityt is the first principal component of the liquidity measures discussed in Section
5. These are shown in Figure 11. Higher values of this variable indicate worse liquidity.
Liquidityt is normalized such that its standard deviation over the regression sample
period is equal to one.
• Y earIndicatorst consists of six indicator variables, indicating each of the six years
(2012 to 2017) following the first major U.K. policy announcement on leverage ratio
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regulation (December 2011).
• PeriodEndIndicatorst consists of four indicator variables for month-ends and quarter-
ends: a variable equal to one on the last day of the month and zero otherwise; a variable
equal to one on the last day of the month if the date is after January 1, 2014 and zero
otherwise; a variable equal to one on the last day of the quarter and zero otherwise; and
a variable equal to one on the last day of the quarter if the date is after January 1, 2012
and zero otherwise. The coefficients on these variables can be interpreted additively:
for example, on quarter-ends after 2014, all four of the variables are equal to one.
• LiquidityOtherMarkett is the liquidity measure from the other market. That is, in
the gilt regressions, this variable is the first principal component of the repo liquidity
measures, while in the repo regressions, it is the first principal component of the gilt
liquidity measures.
• FundingCostst consists of variables related to dealer funding costs, specifically the
3-month Libor-OIS spread (unsecured funding), and the spread between the 3-month
general collateral repo rate and the OIS rate (secured funding).
• Sentimentt is a set of variables indicating general financial market sentiment: the VIX
(the implied volatility of the S&P 500), the percentage change in the FTSE 100, and
the change in the 10-year gilt yield.
• InventoryRiskt consists of variables that affect the riskiness of a gilt portfolio: the
implied volatility of the 10-year sterling interest rate, and the change in the U.K.
sovereign CDS premium.
• EuroCrisist consists of two variables to control for the potential impact of the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis on liquidity: the change in the euro Libor-OIS spread, and
the change in the spread of the 10-year Italian sovereign bond yield over the 10-year
German bund yield.
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• MarketStructuret is a set of variables related to the structure of the market: the
change in the share of gilts held by insurance companies and pension funds (ICPFs);
the change in the market value of the free float (total outstanding gilts minus govern-
ment holdings, APF holdings, and other Bank of England holdings); and, for the gilt
regressions, the ratio of interdealer trading volume to total trading volume.
• GiltMarketEventst consists of indicator variables for the dates of Bank of England
APF (quantitative easing) purchases and the dates of DMO gilt auctions.
• OtherControlst consists of additional control variables, specifically several lags of the
dependent variable (the number of lags is chosen using the Bayesian information cri-
terion), and fixed effects for each quarter-end.7
Summary statistics for the variables used in these regressions are provided in Table 4. All po-
tentially endogenous explanatory variables are lagged by one day. For each of gilt and gilt re-
pos, we run two main regressions: the first includes only Y earIndicatorst, PeriodEndIndicatorst,
and OtherControlst; and the second includes the full set of control variables.
6.2 Market-level regression results
The results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for gilts and gilt repos, respectively. In the
last row of each table, we show the results of a Wald test for the hypothesis that the year
indicator variables are jointly equal to zero.
We consider first the results for gilt liquidity. Column (1) of Table 5 shows that when
we do not control for factors such as funding costs and inventory risk, there is no evidence
that gilt market liquidity became systematically worse during the period when U.K. leverge
ratio policy was introduced. The 2012, 2015, and 2016 indicators are positive and significant,
7The quarter-end fixed effects are constrained to sum to zero. This means that the quarter-end indica-
tor variables in PeriodEndIndicatorst measure the average impact of quarter-ends on liquidity, while the
quarter-end fixed effects pick up the individual deviations around this average. The purpose of the quarter-
end fixed effects is to prevent the very large spikes in the liquidity measures that occur on some quarter-ends
from impacting the coefficients on the year indicator variables.
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indicating that liquidity in these years was worse than in the “control” years (2010 and 2011).
However, the 2014 and 2017 indicators are negative and significant, indicating that liquidity
was on average better during these years relative to 2010 and 2011. This is consistent with a
visual inspection of Figure 8, which shows no clear trend in gilt liquidity over the post-crisis
period. However, as shown in column (2), once we control for a wider range of influences
on liquidity, we find that the conditional liquidity of the gilt market was significantly worse
throughout 2012-2017 relative to 2010 and 2011. Each of the year indicators is positive,
statistically significant and economically significant (recall that the units of the dependent
variable are standard deviations). In column (3), we show that including only the Libor-OIS
spread, interest rate implied volatility, and the gilt interdealer ratio is sufficient to obtain
positive and significant coefficients on each of the year indicators.
Surprisingly, the month-end indicator variable for the period 2014-2017 and the quarter-
end indicator variable for the period 2012-2017 have negative coefficients. This indicates that
liquidity on month-ends and quarter-ends improved relative to average liquidity as leverage
ratio requirements were introduced. This casts doubt on a causal connection between the
leverage ratio and the conditional deterioration in gilt liquidity.
Turning to the other variables, we observe a strong association between funding costs
(measured by the Libor-OIS spread and the GC repo-OIS spread) and gilt liquidity. This
indicates that funding liquidity supports market liquidity, in line with the prediction of
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Meanwhile, increases in inventory risk (measured by
interest rate implied volatility) are associated with reductions in liquidity. We find that a
larger interdealer market is associated with an improvement in liquidity. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that a larger interdealer market improves dealers’ ability to manage their
inventories and share risk, and therefore makes dealers more willing to provide liquidity to
their clients. This result is in line with the findings of Benos and Zikes (2018), but contrasts
with Anderson and Liu (2018), who find that a higher interdealer ratio is associated with
tighter dealer risk constraints. We also find that worse liquidity in the interdealer gilt repo
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market is associated with worse liquidity in the gilt market. Finally, we observe that gilt
market liquidity improves on days when the DMO issues gilts.
We next consider the results for repo liquidity. Both columns of Table 6 indicate that
repo liquidity worsened significantly from 2013 to 2017. This result holds whether or not we
control for other potential determinants of liquidity, and is consistent with Figure 11.8
The estimated coefficients on the indicator variables for month-ends over 2014-2017 and
quarter-ends over 2012-2017 are positive and statistically significant. This indicates that the
deterioration in repo liquidity was particularly pronounced on regulatory reporting dates.
This provides indicative evidence of a causal connection between the leverage ratio and the
reduction in repo liquidity, and reflects the results in Munyan (2015) for the U.S. tri-party
repo market. None of the control variables in the repo regressions are statistically significant,
suggesting that repo liquidity is less sensitive to changes in funding costs, inventory risk, and
market structure than gilt liquidity.
For both markets, the timing of the reduction in liquidity shown by the regressions is
consistent with results from structural break tests. We re-estimate the regressions with the
full set of controls but without the year indicators, and test for a single unknown breakpoint
in the intercept using the supremum Wald test of Andrews (1993). For gilts we detect a
structural break in January 2012, while for repos we detect a structural break in October
2015.
In summary, the market-level regression results suggest that liquidity did worsen in both
markets during the period when U.K. leverage ratio policy was introduced. For gilts, this
result only holds when we control for other factors, while for gilt repos, the result also holds
unconditionally. Changes in liquidity on regulatory reporting dates also provide preliminary
evidence of a causal connection between the leverage ratio and the deterioration in repo
liquidity, although not for gilt liquidity. We find that gilt liquidity is sensitive to several
8We find similar results when we run the regressions separately for general collateral and specific collateral
liquidity measures (available upon request). In most cases, the estimated coefficients on the year indicators
are larger for general collateral and smaller for specific collateral.
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other variables, including funding costs, inventory risk, market structure, and repo liquidity.
On the other hand, repo liquidity appears to be relatively insensitive to changes in market
conditions.
7 Liquidity resilience
Policymakers and market participants have expressed concern that the risk of sudden reduc-
tions in liquidity has increased in recent years, with several well-publicised bouts of volatility
cited as evidence (see, for example, Shafik, 2015 and CGFS, 2016). We therefore consider the
question of whether liquidity became less resilient as banks adjusted to the leverage ratio.
We address this question in two ways. First, we estimate quantile regressions, which allow
us to compare changes in liquidity at different parts of the conditional distribution. Second,
we plot the frequency of sudden “jumps” in liquidity.
Tables 7 and 8 show the results from quantile regressions of equation (1) for the gilt and
repo markets, respectively.9 In each case, column (1) shows the results from the median
regression and column (2) shows the results from the the 0.9 quantile regression. The results
for the 0.9 quantile indicate the impact of the regressors on liquidity in times of poor con-
ditional liquidity. Column (3) shows the differences between the estimated coefficients from
the two regressions.
For both gilts and gilt repos, the results for the conditional median regressions (column
(1)) are broadly similar to the conditional mean regression results shown in Tables 5 and 6.
And in both cases, the results in column (3) show that the estimated coefficient on almost
all of the year indicator variables is larger at the 0.9 quantile than at the median. This
indicates that the (conditional) worsening in liquidity over this period was more pronounced
at times of poor liquidity than at times of normal liquidity, consistent with a reduction in
the resilience of liquidity. For gilts, the difference is statistically significant only for the
9In the quantile regressions we do not include quarter-end fixed effects, because quantile regressions are
robust to outliers.
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2015 and 2016 indicators, and the Wald test results indicate that the differences are jointly
insignificant (column (3), last row). For repos, the difference is statistically significant only
for the 2017 indicator, but the Wald test results indicate that the differences are jointly
significant. We also note that, in the repo market, the 2012-2017 quarter-end effects are
substantially larger at the 0.9 quantile than at the median.
Further evidence that repo liquidity became less resilient is provided by considering the
frequency of jumps in liquidity. Following an approach similar to Adrian et al. (2015a,b),
we define a jump to be a one-day increase in the first principal component of liquidity of
at least one standard deviation.10 Figure 12 shows annual sums of the number of jumps in
liquidity in the two markets. In both markets, jumps were most frequent during the financial
crisis. There is no clear trend in the frequency of jumps in gilt liquidity during the post-crisis
period. But jumps became more frequent in the repo market over 2013-2017, indicating an
increase in the risk that liquidity suddenly evaporates.
8 Dealer-level analysis
The market-level regression results indicate that liquidity in both the gilt and gilt repo mar-
kets worsened during the period when U.K. leverage ratio policy was introduced, once we
control for factors such as changes in funding costs and inventory risk. And the quantile
regression results indicate that this worsening in liquidity was more pronounced in times
of poor liquidity, consistent with a reduction in the resilience of liquidity. However, these
regression results do not provide strong evidence of a causal link between the leverage ratio
and liquidity because the changes in liquidity over this period might have been caused by
some other omitted factor. In order to better identify a potential causal impact, we run
dealer-level panel regressions that exploit two sources of heterogeneity across dealers: het-
erogeneity in the balance sheets of individual dealers, and heterogeneity in the timing of
10We use the standard deviation of the level of the first principal component across 2008-2017 for gilts and
2006-2017 for gilt repos.
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regulatory requirements across jurisdictions.
A significant challenge to this analysis is that we lack a clear treatment date. Policies
were developed gradually, and banks were given lengthy periods of time (typically years)
to adjust ahead of full implementation, making it difficult to establish when a given bank
would have started its adjustment process. Therefore, as discussed in more detail below, we
consider several different specifications and treatment dates. In some specifications, all banks
are assumed to start the adjustment process at the same time. In others, the treatment date
differs across banks. For this second set of regressions, we partition the sample of dealers into
three groups: large U.K. banks (LargeUK), U.K. subsidiaries of U.S. banks (SubsidiaryUS),
and other U.K. entities (OtherUK). The OtherUK group includes both smaller U.K. banks
and U.K. subsidiaries of foreign (non-U.S.) banks. The sizes and market shares of these three
groups are shown in Table 9. We exclude a small number of dealers that are U.K. branches
of foreign banks because we do not have consistent balance sheet data for these entities. We
also exclude any banks that are inactive over either the full pre-treatment period or the full
post-treatment period. For example, we exclude GEMMs that exited the market before the
treatment date. This ensures that all banks in the sample are active both before and after
the treatment date.
The treatment dates that we focus on are the following (see Subsection 3.3 and Table 1
for further detail):
• December 2011: The FPC recommended that the FSA encourage U.K. banks to dis-
close their leverage ratios. The FSA implemented this by asking banks in the LargeUK
group to publish their leverage ratios in their 2012 annual reports and on a bi-annual
basis thereafter.
• June 2012: Regulators in the U.S. proposed a supplementary leverage ratio for large
U.S. banks, including the parent companies of the banks in the SubsidiaryUS group.
Allahrakha et al. (2018) find that this announcement caused affected broker-dealers to
decrease their total repo borrowing.
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• January 2014: PRA-regulated banks started to report regulatory leverage ratios
through COREP on the basis of month-end balance sheets. This was the first time
that banks in the OtherUK group were required to report regulatory leverage ratios.
• January 2016: Banks in the LargeUK group became formally subject to a minimum
leverage ratio requirement.
8.1 Dealer-level regression specifications
We consider several different specifications for the dealer-level regressions. Each takes the
following general form:
LiquidityProvisioni,t = αi + λt + Treatmenti,t (2)
+β1CountryControlsi,t + β2DealerControlsi,t + εi,t,
where:
• LiquidityProvisioni,t is a measure of the liquidity provided by dealer i in quarter t.
We measure liquidity provision in the gilt market in two ways: first, round-trip cost
at the dealer level, which is a measure of the average bid-ask spread that the dealer
charges its clients on gilt trades;11 and second, the log of the dealer’s trading volume
with clients. For the gilt repo market, we measure liquidity provision as the log of
the dealer’s total repo borrowing (we do not observe transaction-level repo data for
individual dealers).
• Treatmenti,t is a function that differs across specifications, as defined below.
• CountryControlsi,t is a vector of control variables for the country where dealer i has
11We do not consider the other two transaction-based liquidity measures (Amihud and Roll) to be mean-
ingful at the individual dealer level.
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its main headquarters, specifically the GDP growth rate and the equity index growth
rate.
• DealerControlsi,t is a vector of control variables at the dealer level: the first lag of
liquidity provision; the log of total assets; return on assets; the share of assets that are
recorded as being in the trading book; the share of assets that are cash or government
bonds; and the risk-weighted capital ratio.
• αi and λt are dealer and time fixed effects, respectively. The dealer fixed effects control
for all time-invariant heterogeneity at the dealer level. The time fixed effects control
for factors that might have impacted the liquidity provision of all dealers in a similar
way, such as the implementation of quantitative easing.
The samples consist of 16 GEMMs and 19 repo dealers. The regressions are at quarterly
frequency, because the dealer-level control variables and the RSL data are available only at
quarterly frequency. Standard errors are double-clustered at the dealer and time level using
the implementation in Correia (2017).
We estimate four versions of equation (2), which differ according to the definition of
Treatmenti,t. Each of these exploits variation in dealers’ leverage ratios at the time of
key policy announcements and/or differences in the timing of leverage ratio implementation
across jurisdictions.
In the first version of equation (2), we define Treatmenti,t as:




1 if LRi,s < 3% and t > s,
0 otherwise,
for s = December 2011. This results in a simple difference-in-differences specification, where
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the treatment (control) group is the set of dealers whose leverage ratios were below (above)
3% in December 2011. December 2011 was the first major U.K. policy announcement re-
garding the leverage ratio, when the FPC recommended that U.K. banks be encouraged
to disclose their leverage ratios from 2013. While this recommendation was only applied
to large U.K. banks, it might have also affected the behavior of other banks by signaling
that U.K. authorities would be front-running the Basel and EU timelines. This definition
of Treatmenti,t is our preferred version, because using a treatment date early in the policy-
making process reduces the possibility that the date falls after banks started adjusting their
balance sheets. This choice of date is also supported by our market-level analysis, which
indicates that there was a structural break in conditional gilt liquidity in January 2012. The
rationale for this definition of Treatmenti,t is that banks whose leverage ratios were below
3% (the regulatory minimum proposed by the BCBS) at the start of the adjustment process
would, over the following years, have needed to adjust their balance sheets by more than
banks with leverage ratios above 3%. If the leverage ratio had a causal impact on liquidity,
we would therefore expect this to have occurred mainly through the liquidity provision of
banks in the treatment group (“constrained” banks). This regression specification is similar
to those used in ESRB (2016) and Acosta-Smith et al. (2018).
In the second version of the regression, we define Treatmenti,t as:




LRi,s if t > s,
0 otherwise,
for s = December 2011. The variable Dec2011_PTLR is equal to the bank’s December 2011
leverage ratio if the date is after December 2011 and zero otherwise (PTLR stands for “pre-
treatment leverage ratio”). Again this results in a difference-in-differences specification, but
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in this case the treatment variable is continuous rather than binary. We include this version
because a bank’s adjustment to the regulatory leverage ratio may have depended on how
far it was from the proposed minimum. In addition, banks typically maintain buffers over
regulatory minima, meaning that even banks with leverage ratios above 3% in December 2011
may have attempted to increase their leverage ratios further. This regression specification is
broadly similar to those used in Allahrakha et al. (2018).
In the third version, we allow the treatment date to differ across banks. We define
Treatmenti,t as:














December 2011 if i ∈ LargeUK,
June 2012 if i ∈ SubsidiaryUS,
January 2014 if i ∈ OtherUK,
and LRi,si is the average leverage ratio across banks in the same group as i (LargeUK,
SubsidiaryUS or OtherUK) at date si. In words, Treated is an indicator variable equal to
one for a given bank after its treatment date (si) and zero otherwise. δ1 therefore measures
the average post-treatment change in the liquidity provision of treated banks, relative to
banks not yet treated. And PTLR is the bank’s leverage ratio at the time of treatment,
minus the mean leverage ratio across all banks in its group. δ2 therefore identifies how
changes in the liquidity provision of treated banks are associated with deviations from the
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within-group average leverage ratio at the time of treatment.
In the fourth version, we define Treatmenti,t as:




1 if i ∈ LargeUK and t > January 2016,
0 otherwise.
This results in a simple difference-in-differences regression, where the treatment group is the
set of large U.K. banks that became subject to a formal minimum regulatory leverage ratio
requirement in January 2016.
Each of the variables used in Treatmenti,t is defined such that, for the regressions with
gilt volumes or repo volumes as the dependent variable, a negative coefficient suggests that
the leverage ratio led to reduced liquidity provision (because treated banks, or those with
lower leverage ratios, reduced volumes relative to other banks); while for the regressions with
round-trip cost as the dependent variable, a positive coefficient suggests that the leverage
ratio led to reduced liquidity provision (because treated banks, or those with lower leverage
ratios, increased their bid-ask spreads relative to other banks).
The first three versions of Treatmenti,t relate to the adjustment period during which
leverage ratio requirements were announced but before they became formally binding. For
these regressions, we use the 2008:Q1 - 2015:Q4 sample period, which ends just before the
leverage ratio requirement for large U.K. banks became binding. The fourth version of
Treatmenti,t relates to the formal introduction of a minimum leverage ratio requirement for
large U.K. banks. For these regressions, we use the 2014:Q1 - 2017:Q4 sample period, which
includes two years of data either side of the treatment date. These choices of sample period
ensure that banks are not treated multiple times within a single regression.
The definition of dealers’ leverage ratios differs across specifications due to data avail-
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ability. For most dealers in the sample, Basel-consistent leverage ratios are unavailable in
December 2011. So for the first and second regression specifications, we use the simple
leverage ratio (Tier 1 capital divided by total assets), calculated from regulatory data at the
individual entity level. Acosta-Smith et al. (2018) show that the simple leverage is highly
correlated with the Basel regulatory definition. For the third specification, we are able to
use regulatory leverage ratios. For LargeUK banks, we use Basel-consistent leverage ratios
at the group level, as reported in their Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) submissions for
2011:Q4. For banks in the OtherUK group, we use regulatory leverage ratios at the U.K.-
group level reported through COREP for 2014:Q1. For the SubsidiaryUS group, we use the
Basel-consistent leverage ratio estimates computed by Allahrakha et al. (2018). These are
based on Form Y-9C filings for 2012:Q2 and are calculated at the BHC level.
8.2 Dealer-level regression results
The regression results are shown in Table 10 for gilts and Table 11 for repos.
We first consider the results for the first version of Treatmenti,t. Columns (1) and (6) of
Table 10 and column (1) of Table 11 show the results when we include dealer and time fixed
effects but no other control variables. The results for this simple difference-in-differences
specification are also represented graphically in Figures 13, 14, and 15. The figures show the
evolution of dealer-level liquidity provision between 2009 and 2015, distinguishing between
banks with leverage ratios above and below 3% as of December 2011. For all measures of
liquidity provision, the sign of the estimated effect is consistent with a causal role for the
leverage ratio in the reduction in liquidity: relative to the control group, dealers with leverage
ratios below 3% increased their average bid-ask spreads on gilt transactions by around 0.9
bps, reduced their gilt trading volumes with clients by around 14%, and reduced their repo
borrowing by around 65%. However, in each case the estimated coefficient is statistically
insignificant.
Columns (2) and (7) of Table 10 and column (2) of Table 11 again show results for the first
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definition of Treatmenti,t, but also include additional country-level and dealer-level controls.
In each case, the added control variables lead to a reduction in the estimated effect, and in
the case of dealer-to-client gilt volumes, the effect changes sign. The estimated coefficients
remain statistically insignificant.
The results for the second version of Treatmenti,t are shown in columns (3) and (8) of
Table 10 and column (3) of Table 11. The results for the third version of Treatmenti,t are
shown in columns (4) and (9) of Table 10 and column (4) of Table 11. Finally, the results for
the fourth version of Treatmenti,t are shown in columns (5) and (10) of Table 10 and column
(5) of Table 11. If the leverage ratio caused the reduction in liquidity, we would expect to see
positive coefficients in the regressions with gilt round-trip cost as the dependent variable, and
negative coefficients in the regressions with gilt volumes or repo volumes as the dependent
variable. But these patterns are not observed: the signs of the estimated coefficients vary
across specifications (some are consistent with a causal role for the leverage ratio, while
others are not), and few of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant.
In summary, the dealer-level analysis does not provide convincing evidence of a causal
link between the leverage ratio and the reduction in gilt and repo liquidity. Dealers with
leverage ratios below 3% at the time of the first U.K. leverage ratio policy announcement
did reduce their liquidity provision relative to the control group over the adjustment period.
But this result is not statistically significant, and is robust neither to the inclusion of control
variables nor to alternative regression specifications.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the impact of the leverage ratio — a key component of the Basel III
package of post-crisis regulatory reform — on the liquidity of the gilt and gilt repo markets
in the U.K.
High-level trends in these markets are indicative of reductions in liquidity during the
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period when U.K. leverage ratio policy was introduced. Over 2012-2016, we find that there
were falls in gilt turnover ratios, gilt repo trading volumes, and the average gilt repo trade
size. These patterns are consistent with market participants reducing their activity and
breaking up trades in response to higher costs. But they are not definitive evidence of
reduced liquidity because they might reflect other trends, such as structural changes in the
investor base.
We therefore compute several more direct measures of liquidity from transaction-level
data, and use principal components analysis to combine these into two liquidity indices: one
for the gilt market and one for the gilt repo market. Time series regressions using these
liquidity indices suggest that gilt repo liquidity indeed worsened during the period when
leverage ratio policy was introduced, and that gilt liquidity worsened conditional on factors
such as funding costs and inventory risk. This suggests that, were funding conditions to
become less benign or interest rate volatility to increase, gilt liquidity could fall to lower levels
than previously would have been the case. For both markets, the timing of the reduction
in liquidity shown in the regression results is consistent with results from structural break
tests.
We also find evidence that the resilience of liquidity deteriorated during the period when
leverage ratio policy was introduced, particularly in the gilt repo market. First, quantile
regression results suggest that the conditional reduction in liquidity has been larger in times
of poor liquidity than in times of median liquidity, although this difference is not always
statistically significant. Second, the frequency of sudden reductions (“jumps”) in gilt repo
liquidity has increased, although we do not observe this trend in the gilt market.
While the market-level analysis indicates that liquidity in these markets reduced, and
potentially became less resilient, during the period when U.K. leverage ratio policy was in-
troduced, evidence on whether the regulatory leverage ratio caused these changes is inconclu-
sive. In the gilt repo market, the market-level regression results show that the deterioration
in liquidity has been particularly pronounced on regulatory reporting dates, when we would
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expect dealer behavior to be especially sensitive to regulatory constraints [and consistent
with the results in Munyan (2015) for the U.S. tri-party repo market]. This provides prelim-
inary evidence of a causal role for the leverage ratio in the reduction in repo liquidity. Such a
pattern is not, however, observed in the gilt market. We also use heterogeneity in dealer-level
liquidity provision to identify any causal role for the leverage ratio. The evidence here is
again inconclusive. In both the gilt and gilt repo markets, dealers with leverage ratios below
3% at the time of the first U.K. leverage ratio policy announcement in 2011 did reduce their
liquidity provision relative to control dealers, consistent with a causal role for the leverage
ratio. But this result is not statistically significant, and is robust neither to the inclusion of
control variables nor to alternative regression specifications.
In summary, while a reduction in market liquidity appears to have occurred alongside the
introduction of leverage ratio regulation in the U.K., the evidence on a causal connection is
inconclusive. We do not attempt to quantify the benefits of the leverage ratio. By leading to
an increase in the capitalization of banks, the leverage ratio is likely to have increased their
resilience to shocks. Assessing the overall impact of the leverage ratio on financial stability
and welfare is beyond the scope of this paper, but is likely to be an important area for future
research.
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2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Nominal value of gilts outstanding
Nominal free float
Nominal APF holdings
Notes: The solid line shows the nominal value of gilts outstanding. The dotted line shows
the nominal value of gilts held by the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) under the Bank of
England’s quantitative easing (QE) program. The dashed line shows the nominal free float,
defined as the value of gilts outstanding minus government holdings, APF holdings and other
Bank of England holdings. Monthly averages.
Sources: U.K. Debt Management Office, Bank of England.
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Annual trading volume (LHS)
Annual trading volume / outstanding (RHS)
Annual trading volume / free float (RHS)
Notes: The solid line shows the annual sum of gilt trading volumes (market value). The
dashed and dotted lines show annual gilt trading volume divided by the market value of gilts
outstanding and the market value of free float, respectively, to give annual turnover ratios.
Annual frequency.
Sources: Zen dataset, U.K. Debt Management Office, Bank of England.
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Number of trades (LHS)
Average trade size (RHS)
Notes: The solid line shows the total number of gilt trades per year. The dashed line shows
the market value of the average trade. Annual frequency.
Source: Zen dataset.
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1997 2002 2007 2012 2017
Open maturity Overnight
Up to one month Longer than one month















































1997 2002 2007 2012 2017
Number of trades (LHS)
Average trade size (RHS)
Notes: The solid line shows the total number of gilt repo trades per year. The dashed line
shows the value of the average trade. Annual frequency.
Source: Form RSL.
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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
All repo (LHS)
Longer than one month (RHS)












































2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Number of trades (LHS)
Average trade size (RHS)
Notes: The solid line shows the total number of gilt repo trades transacted through BrokerTec
per year. The dashed line shows the value of the average trade. Annual frequency.
Source: BrokerTec.
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2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Amihud (LHS) Roll (LHS)
Round−trip−cost (LHS) Yield curve noise (RHS)
Notes: The chart shows liquidity measures for the gilt market, as defined in Subsection 5.1.
Higher values indicate worse liquidity. The units of Amihud, Roll, and round-trip cost are
basis points in price space. These measures are constructed at the level of individual gilts,
and we show the median across gilts. The units of yield curve noise are basis points in yield
space. Quarterly averages.
Sources: Zen dataset, Bank of England, Bloomberg.
47
































2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
General−collateral Amihud (LHS)
General−collateral Roll (RHS)
General−collateral effective spread (RHS)
Notes: The chart shows liquidity measures for the general collateral interdealer gilt repo
market, as defined in Subsection 5.2. Higher values indicate worse liquidity. For all measures,
the units are basis points in repo rate space. The measures are constructed using overnight
trades only. Quarterly averages.
Source: BrokerTec.
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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Specific−collateral Amihud (LHS)
Specific−collateral Roll (RHS)
Specific−collateral effective spread (RHS)
Notes: The chart shows liquidity measures for the specific collateral interdealer gilt repo
market, as defined in Subection 5.2. Higher values indicate worse liquidity. For all measures,
the units are basis points in repo rate space. The measures are constructed using overnight
trades only. The measures are constructed at the level of the underlying security, and we
show the median across securities. Quarterly averages.
Source: BrokerTec.
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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Gilts Interdealer gilt repo
Notes: The chart shows the first principal component of the four gilt liquidity measures
in Figure 8 and of the six gilt repo liquidity measures in Figures 9 and 10. The individual
liquidity measures are standardized prior to the principal components analysis. Higher values
indicate worse liquidity. Quarterly averages.
Sources: Zen dataset, Bank of England, Bloomberg, BrokerTec.
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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Gilts Interdealer gilt repo
Notes: The chart shows annual sums of the number of upward jumps in the first principal
component of the liquidity measures, where a jump is defined to be a one-day increase in
the principal component that is at least as large as the standard deviation of the (level of
the) principal component over the full sample period. Annual frequency.
Sources: Zen dataset, Bank of England, Bloomberg, BrokerTec.
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Banks with leverage ratio of at least 3% at December 2011
Banks with leverage ratio below 3% at December 2011
Notes: The chart shows average round-trip cost by dealer type, indexed to 2011. The
sample consists of 12 banks (only banks that were GEMMs throughout the sample period
are included). Annual frequency.
Source: Zen dataset.
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Banks with leverage ratio of at least 3% at December 2011
Banks with leverage ratio below 3% at December 2011
Notes: The chart shows average dealer-to-client volume by dealer type, indexed to 2011. The
sample consists of 12 banks (only banks that were GEMMs throughout the sample period
are included). Annual frequency.
Source: Zen dataset.
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Banks with leverage ratio of at least 3% at December 2011
Banks with leverage ratio below 3% at December 2011
Notes: The chart shows average borrowing in the gilt repo market, indexed to 2011. The
sample consists of 17 banks (only banks that reported Form RSL throughout the sample
period are included). Annual frequency.
Source: Form RSL.
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Table 1: Leverage ratio timeline
Date Jurisdiction Summary
December 16, 2010 BCBS BCBS proposes a 3% regulatory leverage ratio (disclosure from 2015,
minimum requirement from 2018).
December 6, 2011 U.K. FPC recommends that FSA encourage banks to disclose their leverage
ratios not later than the beginning of 2013; FSA implements this by asking
large U.K. banks to publish their leverage ratios in their 2012 annual
reports and on a bi-annual basis thereafter.
June 7, 2012 U.S. Proposed rule on new capital framework for large U.S. banks, including
draft supplementary leverage ratio.
June 20, 2013 U.K. Results of capital shortfall exercise published; large U.K. banks with a
CET1 leverage ratio below 3% required to submit plans to reach this level.
July 2, 2013 U.S. Final rule on supplementary leverage ratio (full implementation from 2018),
and proposal on enhanced supplementary leverage ratio.
November 29, 2013 U.K. PRA issues supervisory expectation that eight major U.K. banks and
building societies meet a 3% leverage ratio by January 2014.
March 1, 2014 EU PRA-regulated firms start to report regulatory leverage ratios through
COREP on the basis of month-end balance sheets.
April 8, 2014 U.S. Final rule on enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (full implementation
from 2018).
July 11, 2014 U.K. FPC consultation paper on the design of the U.K. leverage ratio framework;
FPC considers applying the framework to all PRA-regulated firms.
October 31, 2014 U.K. FPC review of the leverage ratio framework published; review recommends
that the framework apply only to major U.K. banks and building societies.
July 10, 2015 U.K. PRA consultation paper on implementing the U.K. leverage ratio
framework.
December 1, 2015 U.K. PRA publishes finalised U.K. leverage ratio framework.
January 1, 2016 U.K. Large U.K. banks and building societies become subject to a formal
minimum regulatory leverage ratio requirement.
January 1, 2018 EU All PRA-regulated firms become subject to a 3% minimum leverage ratio
under CRD IV.
Notes: The table describes key dates in the development of U.K. leverage ratio policy, and
selected dates in the development of global, U.S. and European Union leverage ratio policy.
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Table 2: Gilt liquidity measures: annual averages and PCA factor loadings
Liquidity measure 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Loading
Amihud 15.4 17.1 10.1 9.5 11.4 9.6 8.1 11.3 10.1 6.9 0.52
Roll 18.2 22.6 11.7 10.9 18.3 14.1 12.1 13.6 15.3 10.4 0.53
Round-trip cost 21.5 27.5 15.2 15.9 17.6 14.6 12.1 16.0 17.8 13.6 0.51
Yield curve noise 9.6 10.9 4.7 4.8 4.0 3.7 3.5 4.4 3.8 2.6 0.44
Notes: The table shows annual averages of the estimated liquidity measures for the gilt
market. Higher values indicate worse liquidity. The units of Amihud, Roll, and round-trip
cost are basis points in price space. These measures are constructed at the level of individual
gilts, and we show the median across gilts. The units of yield curve noise are basis points in
yield space. The last column shows the factor loadings of the measures in the first principal
component.
Sources: Zen dataset, Bank of England, Bloomberg.
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Table 3: Repo liquidity measures: annual averages and PCA factor loadings
Liquidity measure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Loading
GC Amihud 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.35
GC Roll 1.91 1.96 4.30 2.03 1.11 1.34 1.59 1.74 2.13 2.16 2.75 3.15 0.39
GC effective spread 1.80 2.61 5.59 2.15 1.04 1.39 1.85 2.29 2.25 2.36 3.46 4.20 0.40
SC Amihud 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.49
SC Roll 1.01 1.30 2.24 1.21 0.86 1.00 0.89 1.08 1.30 1.57 1.71 1.57 0.47
SC effective spread 1.02 1.43 2.29 1.41 1.03 0.91 0.72 0.98 0.98 1.44 1.54 1.21 0.33
Notes: The table shows annual averages of the estimated liquidity measures for the inter-
dealer gilt repo market. Higher values indicate worse liquidity. For all measures, the units
are basis points in repo rate space. The measures are constructed using overnight trades
only. The specific collateral measures are constructed at the level of the underlying security,
and we show the median across securities. The last column shows the factor loadings of the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Market-level gilt regressions (continued on next page)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Gilt liquidity Gilt liquidity Gilt liquidity
2012 indicator 0.418*** 0.635*** 0.559***
(0.111) (0.0967) (0.0897)
2013 indicator 0.0239 0.525*** 0.429***
(0.0713) (0.103) (0.0996)
2014 indicator -0.205*** 0.304*** 0.244**
(0.0673) (0.0856) (0.0963)
2015 indicator 0.189** 0.553*** 0.618***
(0.0900) (0.132) (0.116)
2016 indicator 0.226** 0.516*** 0.681***
(0.105) (0.146) (0.127)
2017 indicator -0.359*** 0.296** 0.258**
(0.0919) (0.117) (0.115)
Month-end indicator 0.443* 0.429* 0.439*
(0.235) (0.245) (0.235)
Month-end and 2014-2017 indicator -0.445* -0.490* -0.441*
(0.252) (0.264) (0.255)
Quarter-end indicator 0.339 0.283 0.305
(0.258) (0.248) (0.230)
Quarter-end and 2012-2017 indicator -0.645*** -0.683*** -0.595***
(0.190) (0.183) (0.168)
Repo liquidity (standard deviations) 0.0591**
(0.0265)
3m Libor-OIS spread (%) 1.564*** 1.194***
(0.272) (0.301)




FTSE 100 (% change) -0.00880
(0.0226)
Change in 10y gilt yield (%) 0.809**
(0.351)
1m10y interest rate implied volatility (%) 0.896*** 0.926***
(0.259) (0.240)
Change in U.K. sovereign 5y CDS premium (%) 2.132
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Table 5: Market-level gilt regressions (continued)
(1.457)
Change in 3m Euro Libor-OIS spread (%) -0.106
(1.312)
Change in 10y Italian bond spread (%) -0.487**
(0.229)
Change in share of gilts held by ICPFs (%) -0.0716
(0.0475)
Change in free float (£bn, market value) 0.00372
(0.00413)
Gilt interdealer ratio (%) -0.0131*** -0.0143***
(0.00478) (0.00483)
APF purchase date indicator -0.0577
(0.0520)
DMO issuance date indicator -0.0746*
(0.0414)
Constant -0.316*** -1.337*** -1.065***
(0.0649) (0.290) (0.289)
Observations 2,008 2,008 2,008
R2 0.380 0.421 0.408
Quarter-end fixed effects YES YES YES
Number of lags of dependent variable 3 3 3
Wald statistic for null hypothesis 52.55*** 62.91*** 71.43***
that year indicators are jointly zero (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: The table shows the results of time series regressions of liquidity in the gilt
market. The regression specification is given by equation (1). The regressions are at daily
frequency and the sample period is January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2017. Higher values
of the dependent variable indicate worse liquidity. Variables are defined in Subsection 6.1.
All potentially endogenous regressors are lagged by one day. Quarter-end fixed effects are
constrained to sum to zero. HAC standard errors are shown in parentheses. ‘Wald statistic
for null hypothesis that year indicators are jointly zero’ shows the χ2-statistic from the Wald
test that the coefficients on the year indicator variables are all equal to zero, with p-values
shown below. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10%
level.
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Table 6: Market-level repo regressions (continued on next page)
(1) (2)
Variables Repo liquidity Repo liquidity
2012 indicator 0.0300 0.0167
(0.0404) (0.0755)
2013 indicator 0.166*** 0.217***
(0.0585) (0.0802)
2014 indicator 0.206*** 0.247***
(0.0726) (0.0882)
2015 indicator 0.322*** 0.346***
(0.105) (0.110)
2016 indicator 0.454*** 0.453***
(0.105) (0.165)
2017 indicator 0.418*** 0.471***
(0.125) (0.127)
Month-end indicator 0.526*** 0.510***
(0.164) (0.162)
Month-end and 2014-2017 indicator 0.639*** 0.665***
(0.229) (0.227)
Quarter-end indicator 0.372** 0.395**
(0.162) (0.160)
Quarter-end and 2012-2017 indicator 2.367*** 2.345***
(0.183) (0.186)
Gilt liquidity (standard deviations) 0.00299
(0.0163)
3m Libor-OIS spread (%) 0.231
(0.313)




FTSE 100 (% change) 0.0190
(0.0209)
Change in 10y gilt yield (%) -0.656
(0.433)
1m10y interest rate implied volatility (%) 0.0319
(0.187)
Change in U.K. sovereign 5y CDS premium (%) 0.179
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Table 6: Market-level repo regressions (continued)
(0.526)
Change in 3m Euro Libor-OIS spread (%) 0.0102
(0.468)
Change in 10y Italian bond spread (%) 0.0851
(0.114)
Change in share of gilts held by ICPFs (%) -0.0244
(0.0329)
Change in free float (£bn, market value) -0.000471
(0.00271)
APF purchase date indicator -0.00150
(0.0368)






Quarter-end fixed effects YES YES
Number of lags of dependent variable 23 23
Wald statistic for null hypothesis 26.19*** 20.05***
that year indicators are jointly zero (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: The table shows the results of time series regressions of liquidity in the gilt repo
market. The regression specification is given by equation (1). The regressions are at daily
frequency and the sample period is January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2017. Higher values
of the dependent variable indicate worse liquidity. Variables are defined in Subsection 6.1.
All potentially endogenous regressors are lagged by one day. Quarter-end fixed effects are
constrained to sum to zero. HAC standard errors are shown in parentheses. ‘Wald statistic
for null hypothesis that year indicators are jointly zero’ shows the χ2-statistic from the Wald
test that the coefficients on the year indicator variables are all equal to zero, with p-values
shown below. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10%
level.
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Table 7: Gilt quantile regressions (continued on next page)
(1) (2) (3)
Gilt liquidity Gilt liquidity Gilt liquidity
Variables 0.5 quantile 0.9 quantile Difference
2012 indicator 0.560*** 0.624*** 0.0637
(0.114) (0.194) (0.195)
2013 indicator 0.502*** 0.703*** 0.201
(0.109) (0.207) (0.203)
2014 indicator 0.262*** 0.282 0.0193
(0.0967) (0.192) (0.189)
2015 indicator 0.457*** 0.930*** 0.473*
(0.113) (0.274) (0.262)
2016 indicator 0.477*** 1.023*** 0.547*
(0.133) (0.339) (0.327)
2017 indicator 0.252* 0.443* 0.192
(0.129) (0.262) (0.254)
Month-end indicator 0.114 0.165 0.0511
(0.217) (1.023) (0.992)
Month-end and 2014-2017 indicator -0.0835 -0.293 -0.210
(0.278) (1.027) (1.011)
Quarter-end indicator 0.730 0.369 -0.361
(0.474) (1.064) (1.089)
Quarter-end and 2012-2017 indicator -0.886* -0.774 0.112
(0.522) (1.079) (1.131)
Repo liquidity (standard deviations) 0.0465 0.0344 -0.0121
(0.0349) (0.0552) (0.0565)
3m Libor-OIS spread (%) 1.531*** 1.709*** 0.178
(0.315) (0.529) (0.542)
3m GC repo-OIS spread (%) 2.725*** 1.260 -1.465
(0.872) (1.648) (1.603)
VIX (%) -0.446 3.037** 3.483**
(0.592) (1.538) (1.404)
FTSE 100 (% change) -0.0194 0.0393 0.0587
(0.0275) (0.0657) (0.0631)
Change in 10y gilt yield (%) 0.318 1.080 0.761
(0.500) (1.111) (1.067)
1m10y interest rate implied volatility (%) 0.907*** 0.818* -0.0889
(0.234) (0.476) (0.479)
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Table 7: Gilt quantile regressions (continued)
Change in U.K. sovereign 5y CDS premium (%) 2.074 1.926 -0.148
(1.438) (3.431) (3.161)
Change in 3m Euro Libor-OIS spread (%) 0.342 1.435 1.093
(1.956) (2.510) (2.753)
Change in 10y Italian bond spread (%) -0.666** -0.325 0.341
(0.301) (0.771) (0.722)
Change in share of gilts held by ICPFs (%) -0.0774* -0.0706 0.00683
(0.0409) (0.0781) (0.0783)
Change in free float (£bn, market value) 0.00430 1.84e-05 -0.00428
(0.00408) (0.00626) (0.00611)
Gilt interdealer ratio (%) -0.0129*** -0.0125 0.000451
(0.00465) (0.00915) (0.00930)
APF purchase date indicator -0.0607 0.0735 0.134
(0.0604) (0.149) (0.144)
DMO issuance date indicator -0.0342 -0.212** -0.177*
(0.0456) (0.0916) (0.0906)
Constant -1.304*** -0.844 0.460
(0.280) (0.563) (0.559)
Observations 2,008 2,008 2,008
Pseudo-R2 0.257 0.246 n/a
Quarter-end fixed effects NO NO NO
Number of lags of dependent variable 3 3 3
Wald statistic for null hypothesis 7.40*** 3.61*** 0.84
that year indicators are jointly zero (0.00) (0.00) (0.54)
Notes: The table shows the results of time series quantile regressions of liquidity in the
gilt market. The regression specification is given by equation (1). The regressions are at
daily frequency and the sample period is January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2017. Higher
values of the dependent variable indicate worse liquidity. Variables are defined in Subsection
6.1. All potentially endogenous regressors are lagged by one day. Bootstrapped standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Column (1) shows the results from the conditional median
regression, column (2) shows the results from the conditional 0.9 quantile regression, and
column (3) shows the estimated difference between the coefficients from the two regressions.
‘Wald statistic for null hypothesis that year indicators are jointly zero’ shows the F -statistic
from the Wald test that the coefficients on the year indicator variables are all equal to zero,
with p-values shown below. In column (3), the null hypothesis is that the coefficients from
the 0.9 quantile regression are equal to the coefficients from the median regression. ***
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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Table 8: Repo quantile regressions (continued on next page)
(1) (2) (3)
Repo liquidity Repo liquidity Repo liquidity
Variables 0.5 quantile 0.9 quantile Difference
2012 indicator 0.000497 0.0456 0.0451
(0.0277) (0.0717) (0.0696)
2013 indicator 0.0982*** 0.114 0.0160
(0.0315) (0.0759) (0.0726)
2014 indicator 0.122*** 0.262*** 0.140
(0.0390) (0.0908) (0.0873)
2015 indicator 0.212*** 0.0912 -0.120
(0.0524) (0.117) (0.114)
2016 indicator 0.256*** 0.293* 0.0372
(0.0720) (0.173) (0.167)
2017 indicator 0.194*** 0.510*** 0.316**
(0.0515) (0.148) (0.143)
Month-end indicator 0.192* 1.414** 1.222**
(0.114) (0.586) (0.548)
Month-end and 2014-2017 indicator 1.053*** -0.138 -1.191
(0.235) (0.794) (0.752)
Quarter-end indicator 0.574 0.536 -0.0374
(0.368) (0.839) (0.782)
Quarter-end and 2012-2017 indicator 0.887 3.684** 2.797*
(0.819) (1.538) (1.466)
Gilt liquidity (standard deviations) 0.0103 -0.0238 -0.0341*
(0.00812) (0.0197) (0.0187)
3m Libor-OIS spread (%) 0.0199 0.221 0.201
(0.0935) (0.253) (0.241)
3m GC repo-OIS spread (%) 0.381 1.669* 1.288
(0.409) (0.930) (0.905)
VIX (%) -0.119 -0.0699 0.0496
(0.167) (0.333) (0.327)
FTSE 100 (% change) -0.00685 -0.0134 -0.00651
(0.00827) (0.0198) (0.0190)
Change in 10y gilt yield (%) -0.276 0.153 0.428
(0.176) (0.412) (0.380)
1m10y interest rate implied volatility (%) 0.0561 0.118 0.0623
(0.0714) (0.166) (0.156)
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Table 8: Repo quantile regressions (continued)
Change in U.K. sovereign 5y CDS premium (%) -0.149 0.290 0.439
(0.432) (0.863) (0.836)
Change in 3m Euro Libor-OIS spread (%) 0.0160 -0.595 -0.611
(0.351) (0.596) (0.635)
Change in 10y Italian bond spread (%) -0.0208 0.119 0.140
(0.0746) (0.167) (0.164)
Change in share of gilts held by ICPFs (%) 0.0255* 0.000764 -0.0248
(0.0143) (0.0302) (0.0296)
Change in free float (£bn, market value) -0.00116 -0.00123 -7.11e-05
(0.00118) (0.00293) (0.00286)
APF purchase date indicator 0.0266 -0.00279 -0.0293
(0.0240) (0.0612) (0.0598)
DMO issuance date indicator 0.0114 0.0184 0.00700
(0.0171) (0.0350) (0.0341)
Constant -0.321*** 0.0190 0.340**
(0.0717) (0.165) (0.154)
Observations 2,006 2,006 2,006
Pseudo-R2 0.314 0.472 n/a
Quarter-end fixed effects NO NO NO
Number of lags of dependent variable 23 23 23
Wald statistic for null hypothesis 3.64*** 3.19*** 2.55**
that year indicators are jointly zero (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Notes: The table shows the results of time series quantile regressions of liquidity in the
gilt repo market. The regression specification is given by equation (1). The regressions are
at daily frequency and the sample period is January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2017. Higher
values of the dependent variable indicate worse liquidity. Variables are defined in Subsection
6.1. All potentially endogenous regressors are lagged by one day. Bootstrapped standard
errors are shown in parentheses. Column (1) shows the results from the conditional median
regression, column (2) shows the results from the conditional 0.9 quantile regression, and
column (3) shows the estimated difference between the coefficients from the two regressions.
‘Wald statistic for null hypothesis that year indicators are jointly zero’ shows the F -statistic
from the Wald test that the coefficients on the year indicator variables are all equal to zero,
with p-values shown below. In column (3), the null hypothesis is that the coefficients from
the 0.9 quantile regression are equal to the coefficients from the median regression. ***
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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Table 9: Sizes and market shares of groups of dealers
Gilt market Gilt repo market
Number of dealers Market share Number of dealers Market share
LargeUK 5 40% 7 60%
SubsidiaryUS 5 30% 4 23%
OtherUK 6 29% 8 18%
Notes: The table shows the size and market shares of different groups of dealers over the
sample period 2008:Q1 to 2017:Q4. LargeUK refers to the group of banks that were subject
to the FSA’s implementation of the FPC’s December 2011 recommendation on disclosure, the
PRA’s November 2013 supervisory expectation that banks meet a 3% leverage ratio, and the
formal introduction of the U.K.’s leverage ratio framework in January 2016. SubsidiaryUS
refers to U.K. subsidiaries of U.S. banks. OtherUK refers to smaller U.K. banks and to the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Acosta-Smith, J., M. Grill, and J. H. Lang (2018): “The leverage ratio, risk-taking
and bank stability,” Bank of England working papers 766, Bank of England.
Adrian, T., N. Boyarchenko, and O. Shachar (2017a): “Dealer balance sheets and
bond liquidity provision,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 89, 92–109.
Adrian, T., M. Fleming, O. Shachar, D. Stackman, and E. Vogt (2015a): “Has
liquidity risk in the corporate bond market increased?” Liberty Street Economics, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
Adrian, T., M. Fleming, O. Shachar, and E. Vogt (2017b): “Market Liquidity After
the Financial Crisis,” Annual Review of Financial Economics, 9, 43–83.
Adrian, T., M. Fleming, D. Stackman, and E. Vogt (2015b): “Has liquidity risk in
the Treasury and equity markets increased?” Liberty Street Economics, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.
Allahrakha, M., J. Cetina, and B. Munyan (2018): “Do higher capital standards
always reduce bank risk? The impact of the Basel leverage ratio on the U.S. triparty repo
market,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 34, 3–16.
Amihud, Y. (2002): “Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects,”
Journal of Financial Markets, 5, 31–56.
Anderson, C. and W. Liu (2018): “The Shadow Price of Intermediary Constraints,”
Working paper.
Anderson, M. and R. M. Stulz (2017): “Is Post-Crisis Bond Liquidity Lower?” NBER
Working Papers 23317, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Anderson, N. and J. Sleath (2001): “New estimates of the UK real and nominal yield
curves,” Bank of England working papers, Bank of England.
Andrews, D. (1993): “Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change with Un-
known Change Point,” Econometrica, 61, 821–56.
Aquilina, M. and F. Suntheim (2017): “Liquidity in the UK Corporate Bond Market:
Evidence from Trade Data,” The Journal of Fixed Income, 26, 49–62.
Bank of England (2011): “Record of the Interim Financial Policy Committee meeting,
23 November 2011,” Bank of England.
——— (2013a): “Capital and leverage ratios for major UK banks and building societies,”
Supervisory statement, Bank of England.
——— (2013b): “Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) completes capital shortfall exercise
with major UK banks and building societies,” News release, Bank of England.
70
——— (2014a): “The Financial Policy Committee’s review of the leverage ratio,” Final
report, Bank of England.
——— (2014b): “The Financial Policy Committee’s review of the leverage ratio,” Consulta-
tion paper, Bank of England.
——— (2015a): “The Bank of England’s Sterling Monetary Framework,” Bank of England.
——— (2015b): “CP24/15: Implementing a UK leverage ratio framework,” Consultation
paper, Bank of England.
——— (2015c): “PS27/15: Implementing a UK leverage ratio framework,” Policy statement,
Bank of England.
Bao, J., M. O’Hara, and X. Zhou (2016): “The Volcker Rule and Market-Making in
Times of Stress,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-102, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
BCBS (2009): “Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector,” Consultative document,
Bank for International Settlements.
——— (2010): “The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision reach broad agreement
on Basel Committee capital and liquidity reform package,” Press release, Bank for Inter-
national Settlements.
——— (2014): “Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements,” Bank for
International Settlements.
Benos, E. and F. Zikes (2018): “Funding constraints and liquidity in two-tiered OTC
markets,” Journal of Financial Markets, 39, 24–43.
Bessembinder, H., S. Jacobsen, W. Maxwell, and K. Venkataraman (2018):
“Capital Commitment and Illiquidity in Corporate Bonds,” Journal of Finance, 73, 1615–
1661.
Bessembinder, H., K. M. Kahle, W. F. Maxwell, and D. Xu (2009): “Measuring
Abnormal Bond Performance,” Review of Financial Studies, 22, 4219–4258.
Brunnermeier, M. and L. Pedersen (2009): “Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity,”
Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2201–2238.
Bucalossi, A. and A. Scalia (2016): “Leverage ratio, central bank operations and repo
market,” Occasional Papers 347, Bank of Italy.
CGFS (2014): “Market-making and proprietary trading: industry trends, drivers and policy
implications,” CGFS Papers 52, Bank for International Settlements.
——— (2016): “Fixed income market liquidity,” CGFS Papers 55, Bank for International
Settlements.
71
——— (2017): “Repo market functioning,” CGFS Papers 59, Bank for International Settle-
ments.
Choi, J. and Y. Huh (2017): “Customer Liquidity Provision: Implications for Corporate
Bond Transaction Costs,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-116, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Cimon, D. A. and C. Garriott (2017): “Banking Regulation and Market Making,” Staff
Working Papers, Bank of Canada.
Copeland, A., A. Martin, and M. Walker (2014): “Repo Runs: Evidence from the
Tri-Party Repo Market,” Journal of Finance, 69, 2343–2380.
Correia, S. (2017): “Linear Models with High-Dimensional Fixed Effects: An Efficient and
Feasible Estimator,” Working paper.
Cunliffe, J. (2015): “Market liquidity and market-based financing,” Speech, Bank of Eng-
land.
Dick-Nielsen, J., P. Feldhütter, and D. Lando (2012): “Corporate bond liquidity
before and after the onset of the subprime crisis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 103,
471–492.
Dick-Nielsen, J. and M. Rossi (2018): “The Cost of Immediacy for Corporate Bonds,”
The Review of Financial Studies, 32, 1–41.
DMO (2016): “The UK Debt Management Office’s Remit 2016-17: Minutes of consultation
meeting with GEMMs and investors, held at HM Treasury on 26 January 2016,” Debt
Management Office.
——— (2017): “GEMM Guidebook,” Debt Management Office.
ECB (2012): “Global liquidity: concepts, measurements and implications from a monetary
policy perspective,” ECB Monthly Bulletin, European Central Bank.
ESRB (2016): “Preliminary investigation into the potential impact of a leverage ratio re-
quirement on market liquidity,” European Systemic Risk Board.
Goldstein, M. A., E. S. Hotchkiss, and E. R. Sirri (2007): “Transparency and
liquidity: a controlled experiment on corporate bonds,” Review of Financial Studies, 20,
235–273.
Gorton, G. and A. Metrick (2012): “Securitized banking and the run on repo,” Journal
of Financial Economics, 104, 425–451.
Gromb, D. and D. Vayanos (2002): “Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially
constrained arbitrageurs,” Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 361–407.
Hong, G. and A. Warga (2000): “An empirical study of bond market transactions,”
Financial Analysts Journal, 56, 32–46.
72
Hu, G. X., J. Pan, and J. Wang (2013): “Noise as Information for Illiquidity,” Journal
of Finance, 68, 2341–2382.
ICMA (2015): “Perspectives from the eye of the storm: the current state and future evolution
of the European repo market,” International Capital Markets Association.
IMF (2015): “Global Financial Stability Report,” International Monetary Fund.
Jackson, C. and M. Sim (2013): “Recent developments in the sterling overnight money
market,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 53, 223–233.
Krishnamurthy, A., S. Nagel, and D. Orlov (2014): “Sizing Up Repo,” Journal of
Finance, 69, 2381–2417.
Mancini, L., A. Ranaldo, and J. Wrampelmeyer (2016): “The Euro Interbank Repo
Market,” Review of Financial Studies, 29, 1747–1779.
Miles, D., J. Yang, and G. Marcheggiano (2013): “Optimal Bank Capital,” Economic
Journal, 123, 1–37.
Money Markets Committee (2017): “Minutes of the Money Markets Committee meeting
of 4 July 2017,” Bank of England.
Morgan Stanley and Oliver Wyman (2015): “Liquidity conundrum: shifting risks,
what it means,” Blue Paper, Morgan Stanley.
——— (2016): “Learning to live with less liquidity,” Blue Paper, Morgan Stanley.
Munyan, B. (2015): “Regulatory Arbitrage in Repo Markets,” OFR Working Paper, Office
of Financial Research.
Reuters (2016): “Societe Generale quits as primary dealer for UK public debt,” News
article, Reuters.
Roll, R. (1984): “A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient
Market,” Journal of Finance, 39, 1127–39.
Shafik, M. (2015): “Dealing with change: Liquidity in evolving market structures,” Speech,
Bank of England.
SLRC (2014): “Minutes of the Securities Lending and Repo Committee meeting of 10 July
2014,” Bank of England.
Trebbi, F. and K. Xiao (2017): “Regulation and Market Liquidity,” Management Science,
65, 1949–1968.
73
